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Abstract
We introduce a new dynamic trading strategy based on the systematic mis-
spricing of U.S. companies sponsoring De¯ned Bene¯t pension plans. This port-
folio produces an average return of 1.51% monthly between 1989 and 2004, with
a Sharpe Ratio of 0.26. The returns of the strategy are not explained by those
of primary assets. These returns are not related to those of benchmarks in the
alternative investments industry either. Hence, we are in the presence of a \pure
alpha" strategy that can be ported into a large variety of portfolios to signi¯cantly
enhance their performance.
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1In the last few years, the funding status of De¯ned Bene¯t (DB) pension plans
in corporate America has attracted the attention of practitioners, politicians, and the
media. The combination of a bear stock market and record low levels of interest
rates during the ¯rst two years of the new millennium resulted in an unprecedented
deterioration of the funding status of DB plans. This fact caused several research
department in the securities industry to raise a red °ag over the correct valuation of
the sponsoring companies. Many ¯rms faced pension liabilities, even pension shortfalls,
that exceeded by far their market capitalization.1 The intervention of the Pension
Bene¯t Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) taking over the pension plans of US Airways
and, more recently, United Airlines, has triggered the President's plan for pension
reform, released on January 10th. The latest ¯gures available still point to a large
exposure of American companies to pension liabilities. For instance, pension plan
assets for the companies reported in Compustat totalled about $1.75 trillion at the end
of 2003. This ¯gure is still short some $464 billion of the about $2.2 trillion represented
by the total pension obligations.
In this article, we introduce a successful dynamic trading strategy based on the
systematic mispricing of companies sponsoring DB plans. More speci¯cally, the strat-
egy draws on the pricing anomaly identi¯ed in Franzoni and Marin (2005) and it is
not the result of data mining or manipulating tricks that enhance the performance
of risk-reward measures.2 These authors provide robust evidence of signi¯cant over-
pricing of companies that sponsor de¯ned bene¯t (DB) pension plans running large
pension shortfalls. They argue that it is hard to relate this mispricing to any of the
known sources of economic risk. In the present article, we provide new insights on the
economic principles behind the mispricing and capitalize on them to build our Pension
1The cases of AMR Corp and Delta Airlines Inc are just the tip of an iceberg that includes a large
list of companies (for instance, see Zion and Carcache (2002)).
2For instance, the strategy does not rely on the the use of option like strategies to exhibit superior
performance in \normal times" (say rolling over short positions on deep out of the money put options
on some market index) or to \cut" the upper and lower tail of the distribution of the portfolio to
increase the Sharpe Ratio (see, Goetzman et al. (2003)).
2Plan Underfunding (PPU) trading strategy.
Figure 1 provides a ¯rst approximation to the outstanding performance of the strat-
egy for the period from July 1989 to December 2004. The ¯gure reports the cumulative
monthly returns of a version of the strategy that is neutral to the three Fama and French
(1993) factors. As we can appreciate, the strategy beats not only its natural bench-
marks (LIBOR and bond returns) but also the S&P 500 and the HFR funds of hedge
funds index. Furthermore, the strategy performs reasonably well during the turbulent
market period of 2000-2002. Even more striking, it o®ers outstanding performance
during the period 2002-2004, a dull time in the hedge fund industry. This graphic
overview already suggests that we are in the presence of a true active constituent in
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Figure 1: Cumulative returns
In order to understand the economics behind the success of the strategy we ¯rst
3turn to a brief overview of the DB pension plan system.
1 DB Pension Plan Elements
In a DB pension plan, the sponsoring ¯rm commits to provide retirement bene¯ts
to employees according to a formula that takes into account the employee's years of
service and the present and future salaries. The sponsoring ¯rm must make ¯nancial
contributions over time according to legally speci¯ed formulas. These contributions are
invested in assets at the sole discretion of the employer. Hence, at each point in time a
company sponsoring a DB pension plan faces a ¯nancial liability, which is equal to the
present value of the retirement bene¯ts, and holds a portfolio of assets dedicated to the
plan. When the market value of the pension assets is less than the value of the liability
the pension plan is \underfunded"; otherwise the plan is \overfunded". By extension,
we will refer to under- or overfunded ¯rms. The funding status of each plan sponsored
by an emplyer is reported annually in IRS Form 5500 and the aggregate funding status
of the sponsoring ¯rms is reported annually in the footnotes of the company ¯nancial
statements (SEC 10-K ¯ling).
The funding status of DB plans a®ects corporate earnings and cash°ows via manda-
tory contributions and amortization rules. For our purposes, and for the sake of brevity,
it is enough to provide a broad description of how mandatory contributions a®ect cash-
°ows.3 Companies with overfunded pension plans are not required to make contribu-
tions. Companies running underfunded plans must contribute an amount equal to the
larger of two components: the minimum funding contribution and the de¯cit reduction
requirement. The ¯rst one is de¯ned as the previous year `normal cost' of the plan (i.e.,
the present value of pension bene¯ts accrued during the period) plus the unfunded obli-
gation amortized over a period of ¯ve to thirty years. The de¯cit reduction requirement
imposes the full amortization of the underfunding during three to ¯ve years and sets
the fraction that must be contributed during the ¯rst year according to the formula
3We focus on the legal framework applicable during the period our study covers; in particular, on
the rules set by the Pension Protection Act of 1987.
4minf0:30;[0:30 ¡ 0:25 ¤ (funding status ¡ 0:35)]g, where funding status is de¯ned as
plan liabilities over plan assets.4 A ¯rm running an underfunded plan can waive the
contribution if the ratio of assets to liabilities in the plan is above 80% in the current
year and was more than 90% for the past two years. As a consequence, a company
running very large underfundings for a few years in a row cannot abstain from making
the contributions.
We argue that this feature of the regulatory environment is at the basis of the
success of our strategy. In particular, the regulatory environment generates the possi-
bility of forecasting an important component of future cash°ows using the company's
funding history information. We exploit the role played by the mandatory de¯cit re-
duction contribution for companies that cannot avoid transfering money to the fund.
This contribution can be as large as 30% of the shortfall for plans that did not expe-
rience shortfalls in the past, but can be even larger in the case of plans that have run
underfundings for a few consecutive years.
2 A Theory of DB Companies Mispricing
Franzoni and Marin (2005) provide evidence of signi¯cant overpricing of companies
experiencing large de¯cits in their DB pension plans and argue that the mispricing is
not related to risk. In particular, the authors ¯nd alphas around -10.6% annually for
the decile portfolio of most underfunded companies, in the context of the most widely
accepted asset pricing models (i.e., controlling for the three Fama and French (1993)
factors). In contrast, they ¯nd no evidence of mispricing in the case of overfunded com-
panies. What are the economic principles behind this type of asymmetric mispricing?
They propose a theory of the mispricing based on two basic assumptions: investors
misperceptions and corporate management short-termism.
Since the mispricing is not related to risk, it must be the case that ¯nancial an-
alysts, or investors in general, do miss some important information contained in the
4The Retirement Protection Act of 1994 changed the de¯cit reduction rules in a way that the ¯rst
year de¯cit-reduction is equal to minf0:30;[0:30 ¡ 0:40 ¤ (funding status ¡ 0:60)]g.
5companies' funding status either because they do not pay enough attention to this type
of information or because they are unable to correctly interpret it.5 Hence, investors
learn about this information when contributions hit the company's earnings and cash-
°ows. Moreover, given the institutional framework described above, in the presence of
corporate management short-termism6, we should expect the managers of ¯rms run-
ning pension de¯cits to delay as much as possible the recognition of the shortfall in
cash°ows and earnings. This can be done by contributing and amortizing the smallest
allowable amount in the short term and hope for reversals in funding status in the long
run. Hence, these companies will tend to be overpriced (as the current price does not
adjust to the new liability the company faces). Later on, when the funding situation
does not improve and managers are compelled to reduce earnings and cash°ows, in-
vestors are surprised and prices adjust downwards. On the other hand, we conjecture
that companies running pension surpluses behave in the opposite way, using the over-
fundings to bust earnings and cash°ows as soon as they arise. Because earnings and
cash°ows adjust immediately, we do not expect these companies to be mispriced.
5There is a generalized view that rules that regulate the incorporation of pension elements into
income statements of the sponsoring ¯rm and the mandatory contributions in case of shortfalls are too
complex (for instance see, Zion and Carcache (2002)) and too vulnerable to management manipulation
(Bergstresser et al. (2005)).
6For evidence on opportunistic behavior by managers of DB companies see, for instance, Bergstresser
et al. (2005); for an analysis of management short-termism in general, see Stein (1989) .
63 PPU Strategies
In Franzoni and Marin (2005), the underpriced porfolio is obtained by selecting the
most underfunded companies at each portfolio formation date. If the driving force of
these results is the one we expose above, then we should be able to increase the size
of the overpricing by identifying companies prone to experience the largest cash°ow
corrections in the period after portfolio formation. These ¯rms are not necessarily the
same as those facing the largest shortfalls. This is the basic philosophy behind our
PPU strategy and what represents the departure from Franzoni and Marin (2005):
select companies facing the largest expected cash°ows corrections in the near term due
to their funding history, rather than ¯rms running large pension de¯cits in the most
recent ¯scal year.
Given the institutional setting described above, one simple way of achieving this
goal is to select companies that have experienced large pension shortfalls for several
consecutive years. For these companies, corporate managers can no longer delay the
impact of mandatory contributions on cash°ows. Accordingly, prices adjust within the
year after portfolio formation. This simple forecasting rule is enough to form portfolios
of underfunded companies that exhibit alphas of about -15.4% annually with respect
to the Fama and French (1993) model. In other words, we are able to increase the
mispricing reported in Franzoni and Marin (2005) by almost 50%.
We now turn to the description of the strategies in more detail and to the assessment
of their performance.
3.1 First Building Block: The Overpriced Portfolio
As in Franzoni and Marin (2005) we de¯ne a ¯rm's funding ratio for year t as:
FRt =




² FVPA represents the market value of the assets (stocks, bonds, and other invest-
7ments) that are set aside and restricted (usually in a trust) to pay bene¯ts when
due.
² PBO represents the actuarial present value of vested and nonvested bene¯ts
earned by an employee for service rendered to date plus projected bene¯ts at-
tributable to salary increases.
² Market Cap is the company's market capitalization in December of the calendar
year when the pension items are measured.
Thus, the variable FRt measures the aggregate funding status of a company over
all its pension plans relative to a measure of its size, that is, market capitalization. The
pension data items can be obtained from Compustat.
In July of year t, we construct a value weighted portfolio of underfunded companies
with high expected cash°ows corrections due to pension shortfalls. We choose July to
make sure that all the necessary information for the construction is public. By that
date, the accounting data, where the company funding status is reported, should be
publicly available. This portfolio is composed of the companies in the bottom quintile
of the distribution of FRt¡1, conditional on those companies that displayed a negative
value of FR in years t ¡ 1, t¡2, t¡3 and t¡4. Hence, the portfolio includes the most
highly underfunded stocks in year t¡1 among those that have run four consecutive years
of underfunded pension plans. This feature is intended to capture those companies that
cannot waive the contributions to the pension plans. Portfolios are reformed each year
to obtain the time series of monthly returns of the strategy. The average number of
stocks in this portfolio for the period between July 1984 and December 2004 is about
seventy-two.7
We provide evidence of the mispricing of this portfolio with respect to three di®erent
models: a one-factor model (CAPM), the Fama-French three-factor model, and a four-
factor model composed of the Fama-French three factors plus a momentum factor.8
7More details on the constructions of the pension variables and the treatment of outliers are provided
in Franzoni and Marin (2005).
8The factors data come from Prof. Ken French's website.
8Table 1 reports the intercepts (alphas), factor loadings and R-squared from the
time-series regression of portfolio excess returns (returns in excess of one-month T Bill
rate) on three di®erent set of factors between July 1984 and December 2004, according
to the following regression:
Rit = ®i + ¯ifactorst + "it:
The factors are the excess return on the market value-weighted portfolio (Mkt-Rf),
the return on a value factor (High-minus-Low Book-to-Market portfolio, HML), the
return on a size factor (Small-minus-Big size portfolio, SMB), and the return on the
momentum portfolio (return on past twelve months winners minus return on past twelve
months losers, MOM).
In all cases reported in Table 1, the mispricing of our portfolio is more than 40%
larger than the one identi¯ed in Franzoni and Marin (2005). For example, in the
context of the three Fama-French factors, this portfolio produces a strikingly high
alpha (in absolute terms) of 1.28% monthly (about 14.4% annually), compared to
0.89% monthly obtained in Franzoni and Marin (2005). Hence, the evidence presented
in this table represents an extension of Franzoni and Marin's (2005) results concerning
the mispricing of underfunded ¯rms.
9Table 1: Alphas. The table reports alphas, factor loadings, and R2 for the portfolio
based on pension plan underfunding. The portfolio is formed in July of year t by value
weighting the returns of companies that are in the ¯rst quintiles of the distribution of
FR in year t ¡ 1, among the ¯rms for which FR was negative in the years t ¡ 1, t ¡ 2,
t¡3, and t¡4. The one-factor model includes the excess return on the market value-
weighted portfolio from CRSP. The three-factor model includes Fama and French's
(1993) three factors (the Market, HML, and SMB). The four-factor model includes
Fama and French's (1993) three factors plus the momentum factor from Prof. Ken
French's website. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Alpha Mkt-Rf HML SMB MOM R2
1 Factor -0.69 1.16 0.48
(-1.99) (15.29)
3 Factors -1.28 1.48 1.00 0.38 0.61
(-4.12) (19.10) (8.64) (4.02)
4 Factors -1.07 1.44 0.97 0.41 -0.20 0.62
(-3.43) (18.71) (8.49) (4.32) (-3.11)
103.2 The PPU Strategy
The portfolio that we have just examined exhibits remarkable mispricing in the context
of widely accepted asset pricing models but its returns are still sensitive to economic
risks. In this section, we construct dynamic trading strategies based on this portfolio,
in which those risks are hedged.
Since the strategy is based on equities, we ¯rst compute an equity-risk neutral
version of the strategy. Following the standard procedure in the literature, we use the
three Fama-French factors to summarize this risk. The resulting neutral strategy is the
one we referred to at the beginning of this article and whose cumulative returns are
reported in Figure 1.
In order to make the strategy neutral to the factors, we need to estimate the portfolio
\betas" or factor loadings. To this purpose, using the returns on the porfolio examined
in Table 1, we run time-series regression of portfolio excess return on the three factors
over ¯ve years of monthly data. The sixty-month estimation window rolls forward by
one month between July 1984 and December 2004. Then, each month between July
1989 and December 2004 we can construct a portfolio that is long in the three factors
by an amount equal to the latest estimated betas and short in one unit of the portfolio
considered in Table 1. The rest of the portfolio is invested in the risk free rate, that is,
the one-month T bill rate. We label the resulting portfolio Pension Plan Underfunding
(PPU) strategy. The returns on this strategy are neutral (on average) to equity risk,
which is summarized by the three Fama-French risk factors.
Table 2 reports summary statistics on the monthly percent returns of this strategy,
along with the returns of the S&P 500 and the HFR Funds of Funds Index. We choose
these two benchmarks because the PPU strategy is equity based and, given its short
position, it has the characteristics of a hedge fund. It is remarkable that not only does
our strategy perform well in the bull market of the nineties, but also it earns positive
returns in the bear market that followed. Furthermore, in the latest years, which have
been notoriously disappointing for the hedge fund industry, the PPU strategy does not
lose its vigor. For completeness, we have to say that the outstanding performance in
112001 is largely due to the extreme observation in September, when the strategy earned
about 21.4%. It is possible that the crash that followed September 11 brought to a
faster revelation of the mispricing of the ¯rms sponsoring underfunded pension plans.
Excluding September gives an average return in 2001 of 0.53% monthly, still higher
than the two benchmarks, while the average return in the whole sample is largely
una®ected, being 1.40%.
Table 2 also shows that the PPU strategy displays excess kurtosis. This kurtosis is,
however, more than twice smaller than for the funds of funds index. Furthermore, the
returns on the PPU strategy are positively skewed, unlike the returns on the S%P 500
and the hedge funds index. We postpone the normality tests to Section 4. For now,
su±ce it to say that those results legitimate us to proceed with mean-variance analysis.
Table 3 extends the comparison of the risk-return characteristics of the PPU strat-
egy to other benchmark portfolios. In particular, we include the S&P 500 Index, the
value factor (HML) and the size factor (SMB) to check that the strategy is neutral to
U.S. equities; an index of global equities { the MSCI Global Equity Index (Gl. Eq.);
two bond indices { the JP Morgan U.S. Bonds Index (U.S. B.) and the JP Morgan
Global Bonds Index (Gl. B.); a hedge fund index { the HFR Funds of Funds Index;
and a strategy that has received considerable attention in the last years, the momentum
portfolio (MOM). All the series range from July 1989 to December 2004 (except for the
HFR index that starts in January 1990). In terms of average returns, the strategy beats
all the other portfolios, including the momentum strategy. The risk of the strategy is
similar to the risk of the equity portfolios, hence, it is larger than the risk of the bonds
and much larger than the risk of hedge funds. In terms of Sharpe Ratios, the strategy
is only beaten by the index of funds of funds. This fact is expected, as in the index of
hedge funds the idiosyncratic risks of many alpha strategies are diversi¯ed away, which
results in a portfolio whose volatility must be smaller than that of individual alpha
strategies. By construction, the strategy exhibits very low correlations with the S&P
and the value and size factors. This means the strategy can be ported into arbitrary
equity benchmarks to create an equity based portable alpha strategy.
12However, the strategy is positively correlated with bond returns and the momentum
portfolio. Intuitively, a ceteris paribus decrease (increase) in interest rates generates a
deterioration (improvement) in the pension status of a company, which in turn tends
to increase (decrease) the return of our strategy, as well as the return of a portfolio of
bonds. As for momentum, we notice that the PPU strategy is short in underfunded
companies. Franzoni and Marin (2005) show that these companies experienced poor
past operating performance and have earned negative returns in the recent past. Our
strategy does well because these stocks display negative returns also in the period after
portfolio formation. Hence, there is momentum in the PPU portfolio. Indeed, it is
plausible that our sorting procedure, based on accounting data, partly overlaps with
the sorting procedure in momentum strategies, which is entirely based on past returns.
The positive correlation with bonds and momentum questions the quali¯cation of
the PPU strategy as a \pure alpha" strategy, i.e. as an investment whose returns are
not related to the performance of primary assets.9
To shed these concerns, we derive versions of our strategy that are immunized to
these benchmarks and that preserve the outstanding performance of the original PPU
strategy. In particular, we obtain the versions of the strategy that are neutral to bonds
and momentum in addition to the three Fama-French factors. Relative to the original
construction of the PPU strategy, we add an extra long position in the new assets (either
the two bond indices or the momentum factor). The last two rows of Table 3 report the
risk/return characteristics of these \super neutral" strategies (PPUb is bond neutral
and PPUm is momentum neutral). Neutralizing the exposure to bonds reduces the
monthly alpha by 17 basis points, from 1.51% to 1.34%. Neutralizing the momentum
return is more costly, up to 32 monthly basis points. In both cases, the volatility of
the strategy remains almost unchanged. The important fact, however, is that the two
versions of the strategy beat many of the alternative asset classes included in Table 3 in
terms of Sharpe Ratio. The evidence that we provide in the next section con¯rms that
9Strictly speaking the momentum strategy is not a primary asset. We include it here because the
controversy on whether momentum is a proxy for some risk factor or an alpha is still open.
13the actual correlation with bond returns or momentum is not high enough to denote
the PPU strategy as a bond market style or a trend following style.
14Table 2: Annual Performance and Summary Statistics. The table reports
average monthly returns for each year of data availability for the PPU strategy, S&P
500, and HFR Funds of Funds Index. The average, standard deviation, skeweness, and
excess kurtosis are also reported for the whole sample. The sample ranges from July
1989 to December 2004, except for the HFR index, which starts in January 1990.
Year PPU S&P500 FoF
1989 4.99 1.84 NA
1990 3.90 -0.44 0.61
1991 0.19 2.06 0.90
1992 3.18 0.39 0.94
1993 2.56 0.58 1.83
1994 1.46 -0.09 -0.37
1995 0.60 2.49 0.97
1996 1.09 1.59 1.30
1997 0.85 2.37 1.34
1998 1.08 2.18 0.16
1999 0.63 1.56 1.27
2000 0.03 -0.78 0.61
2001 2.28 -1.01 0.42
2002 0.41 -2.03 0.09
2003 0.80 2.02 0.82
2004 1.81 0.74 0.58
Average 1.51 0.81 0.76
Std Dev 4.44 4.20 1.23
Skewness 0.41 -0.44 -0.92
Exc. Kurt. 2.68 0.62 6.30
15Table 3: Performance Comparison. The table reports means, standard deviations
(St. Dev.), Sharpe Ratios (S.R.) and correlations for the monthly percentage returns
on the Pension Plan Underfunding (PPU) strategy and other portfolios. The other
portfolios are: the S&P 500 Index, the Fama and French (1993) SMB and HML factors,
the MSCI Global Equity Index, the JP Morgan U.S. Bonds Index, the JP Morgan
Global Bonds Index, the HFR Fund of Funds Composite Index, and the momentum
factor (MOM) from Prof. Ken French's website. We also include two super-neutral
versions of the PPU strategy: the ¯rst one (PPUb) is neutral to the three Fama and
French factors plus the two bond factors; the second one (PPUm) is neutral to the
three Fama and French factors plus the momentum factor (MOM). The sample period
is July 1989 to December 2004, except for the HFR index which is only available from
January 1990.
Correlations
Mean St. Dev. S. R. PPU S&P500 HML SMB Gl. Eq. U.S. B. Gl. B. FoF MOM
PPU 1.51 4.44 0.26 1.00
S&P500 0.81 4.20 0.11 -0.02 1.00
HML 0.33 3.51 0.09 -0.12 -0.43 1.00
SMB 0.14 3.78 0.04 0.06 0.00 -0.44 1.00
Gl. Eq. 0.56 4.29 0.05 0.01 0.82 -0.42 0.13 1.00
U.S. B. 0.61 1.33 0.20 0.21 0.02 0.11 -0.18 -0.01 1.00
Gl. B. 0.68 1.83 0.18 0.23 0.07 0.02 -0.13 0.22 0.65 1.00
FoF 0.76 1.23 0.34 0.11 0.52 -0.30 0.40 0.53 0.09 -0.01 1.00
MOM 0.95 4.93 0.19 0.28 -0.23 -0.06 0.11 -0.14 0.23 0.14 0.12 1.00
PPUb 1.34 4.47 0.22 0.97 -0.02 -0.14 0.03 -0.02 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.26
PPUm 1.19 4.44 0.19 0.97 0.02 -0.13 0.04 0.03 0.17 0.20 0.07 0.08
164 PPU as a \Portable Alpha" Strategy
The analysis conducted so far shows that the returns on the PPU strategy (either
in its original version or in its \super-neutral" versions) are not strongly correlated
with the returns of primary assets. This evidence, which is further explored in this
section, suggests that the strategy is a pure alpha constituent in general portable alpha
strategies.
First, we perform a style analysis using as benchmarks the asset classes that have
been shown to capture most of the variation in mutual fund returns.10 In particular,
we follow Fung and Hsieh (1997) and choose eight indices: the MSCI U.S. Equity Index
(US Eq); the MSCI non-U.S. Equity Index (Non-US Eq); the MSCI Emerging Markets
Index (Em Mkt); the JP Morgan U.S. Bonds Index (US Bond); the JP Morgan non-
U.S. Bonds Index (Non-US Bond); the one-month eurodollar deposit rate (1-Month
ED); the gold price index (Gold); and the Federal Reserve's Trade Weighted Dollar
Index (US Dollar).
Table 4 reports the results from the regression of the PPU strategy (in the version
which is immunized to the three Fama-French factors) on the eight benchmarks. We
consider three samples. The longer sample coincides with the period of availability
of the PPU returns. The two sub-periods have been chosen as in Fung and Hsieh
(2004) to isolate two potential structural breaks in the market: the collapse of LTCM
in September 1998 and the end of the Internet bubble in March 2001. In all samples,
the explanatory power of the factors is very low, the adjusted R2 never exceeding 6%.
Also, none of the proposed benchmarks is statistically signi¯cant at conventional levels
(the t-statistics are given in parentheses). The factor with the highest explanatory
power is the U.S. Bonds Index, con¯rming the correlation of the PPU strategy with
bond returns. Finally, in two regressions out of three, there is an economically and
statistically signi¯cant intercept, testifying that the returns on the PPU strategy are
10First introduced in Sharpe (1992) for the study of mutual funds performance, style analysis was
later on extended in Fung and Hsieh (1997) to the case of hedge funds performance.
17largely unexplained by the conventional benchmarks.11
The eight factors used above work well for mutual funds, because the location
choice, i.e. the choice of the asset class, is more relevant than the dynamic aspect of
the trading strategy (see Fung and Hsieh (1997)). However, the PPU trading strategy
is inherently dynamic and it involves short positions. These characteristics make it
close to a hedge fund strategy. It is commonly believed that a style analysis of the
type proposed by Sharpe (1992) is not suitable to describe the performance of actively
managed portfolios such as hedge funds (see, for example, Brown and Goetzmann
(1997) and Fung and Hsieh (1997)).
For this reason, we replicate the style analysis using a set of alternative benchmarks
that have been found to capture the dynamic connotation of hedge fund strategies.
These factors are the seven Asset Based Styles (ABS) identi¯ed by Fung and Hsieh
(2004). There are two equity-oriented benchmarks: the S&P 500 index (S&P500) and
a portfolio that captures the size risk, that is, the Wilshire 17500 index minus the
Wilshire 750 index (SC-LC). Two factors describe the bond market: the month end-
to-month end change in the Federal Reserve's ten-year constant maturity yield (10Y);
and the month end-to-month end change in the di®erence between Moody's Baa yield
and the Federal Reserve's ten-year constant maturity yield (Cred Spr). Finally, there
are three factors that capture the returns of trend following managers: a portfolio
of lookback straddles on bond futures (Bd Opt); a portfolio of lookback straddles on
currency futures (FX Opt); and a portfolio of lookback straddles on commodity futures
(Com Opt).
The results from the style analysis with these alternative benchmarks are reported
in Table 5. In terms of explanatory power the ABS do not perform better than the
standard benchmarks. Again, the R2 is never higher than 6%. The only factor that has
some statistical signi¯cance according to the t-statistics reported in parentheses is the
11The cause of the insigni¯cant intercept in the later sub-period is the fact that the currency factor
had a large negative realization, due to the U.S. Dollar depreciation. However, the lack of statistical
signi¯cance of both the loading on the currency factor and the intercept cannot lead us to conclude
that returns on the PPU strategy are explained by this factor.
18size spread (SC-LC), but only in the overall sample. Further, the lack of signi¯cance
of the bond market factors and of the trend following styles address the concern raised
by the correlation of PPU returns with bond and momentum returns. Our trading
strategy does not overlap with bond market or trend following styles. Finally, the
large and signi¯cant intercepts con¯rm that the set of alternative benchmarks does not
capture the performance of the PPU strategy.
Overall, the evidence in Tables 4 and 5 suggests that the PPU strategy, which is
hedged against the risks in the three Fama-French factors, does not load on any source
of risk among the ones that describe the performance of mutual and hedge funds. This
¯nding contributes to characterize PPU returns as a portable alpha for standard and
alternative investments.
Style analysis rules out linear dependence on the returns of benchmark portfolios.
As a robustness check, we would like to make sure that the PPU strategy does not
display a non-linear relationship with these factors, which is an important requirement
for portability. To this purpose, we use the method developed in Fung and Hsieh
(2005). The monthly returns on the eight standard benchmarks and the seven ABS
factors are individually sorted from worst to best into quintiles. The average return
for each quintile of the indices and the average of the corresponding months for the
PPU returns are graphed in the same plot. Figure 2 contains the eight plots for the
standard benchmarks and Figure 4 the corresponding plots for the seven alternative
factors. With a few exceptions, the prevalent pattern is a °at relationship between
PPU returns and the benchmarks, which suggests a lack of non-linear dependence.
The exceptions concern the bond market factors in the two sets of benchmarks. There
is some positive (negative) correlation between bond returns (yields) and PPU returns.
This ¯nding was ¯rst revealed in Section 3. There, we show that a version of the PPU
strategy that is neutral to bond risk factors still displays outstanding performance (see
Table 3).
Finally, to justify the mean-variance analysis of Section 3, we need to assess the
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Figure 2: PPU by Quintiles of Standard Benchmarks
kurtosis reported in Table 2, normality is rejected. However, excess kurtosis could
be due to time-varying volatility. In such as a case, returns could still be normal
and mean variance analysis would be justi¯ed. Hence, as in Fung and Hsieh (2005),
we ¯t an AR(1) model to PPU returns and a GARCH(1,1) model to the conditional
volatility. Then, we consider the distribution of the standardized residuals (that is, the
residuals divided by the conditional volatility).12 At ¯rst, it seems that normality is
still rejected for the standardized residuals. However, a closer look allows us to identify
September 2001 as the outlier, which is causing the excess kurtosis. As said above, in
this anomalous month, PPU returns were extremely high (21.4%). Once we discard
this admittedly unusual month, the excess kurtosis of the standardized residuals is 0.06,
the skewness is 0.08, and normality is not rejected. We are then legitimated to evaluate
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Figure 3: PPU by Quintiles of Alternative Benchmarks
the PPU strategy in terms of its mean-variance performance.
21Table 4: Style Analysis: Standard Benchmarks. The table reports estimates
of the intercept and slopes from the regression of the returns on the PPU strategy on
eight benchmarks. The adjusted R2 is also reported. The regression is performed on
di®erent samples, which are provided in the table. The eight factors are: the return on
the MSCI U.S. Equity Index (US Eq); the return on the MSCI non-U.S. Equity Index
(Non-US Eq); the return on the MSCI Emerging Markets Index (Em Mkt); the return
on the JP Morgan U.S. Bonds Index (US Bond); the return on the JP Morgan non-
U.S. Bonds Index (Non-US Bond); the return on the one-month eurodollar deposits
(1-Month ED); the return computed from a gold price index (Gold); the return on the
Federal Reserve's Trade Weighted Dollar Index (US Dollar). T-statistics are given in
parentheses.
Dep. Var.: PPU
Jul 89 - Dec 04 Jul 89 - Sep 98 Apr 02 - Dec 04
Intercept 1.23 1.72 0.45
(3.19) (3.11) (0.62)
US Eq 0.04 0.08 0.25
(0.39) (0.52) (0.68)
Non-US Eq -0.06 -0.01 -0.46
(-0.51) (-0.11) (-1.08)
Em Mkt -0.03 -0.02 -0.04
(-0.45) (-0.21) (-0.21)
US Bond 0.60 0.74 0.27
(1.90) (1.48) (0.52)
Non-US Bond -0.21 -0.52 -0.13
(-0.56) (-1.09) (-0.15)
1-Month ED -0.02 0.04 -0.08
(-0.33) (0.54) (-0.93)
Gold 0.07 -0.04 0.22
(0.74) (-0.32) (1.10)
US Dollar -0.64 -1.07 -1.03
(-1.38) (-1.79) (-0.89)
R2 0.04 0.01 0.06
22Table 5: Style Analysis: Alternative Benchmarks. The table reports estimates
of the intercept and slopes from the regression of the returns on the PPU strategy on
the Fung and Hsieh (2001) factors. The adjusted R2 is also reported. The regression is
performed on di®erent samples, which are provided in the table. The seven factors are:
the return on the S&P500 index (S&P); the return on the Wilshire 17500 index minus
the return on the Wilshire 750 index (SC-LC); the month end-to-month end change in
the Federal Reserve's ten-year constant maturity yield (10Y); the month end-to-month
end change in the di®erence between Moody's Baa yield and the Federal Reserve's ten-
year constant maturity yield (Cred Spr); the return on a portfolio of lookback straddles
on bond futures (Bd Opt); the return on a portfolio of lookback straddles on currency
futures (FX Opt); the return on a portfolio of lookback straddles on commodity futures
(Com Opt). T-statistics are given in parentheses.
Dep. Var.: PPU
Jan 94 - Dec 04 Jan 94 - Sep 98 Apr 02 - Dec 04
Intercept 1.02 1.07 1.35
(3.04) (2.74) (2.00)
S&P500 0.00 0.13 0.09
(-0.02) (1.24) (0.52)
SC-LC 0.23 0.24 -0.13
(2.23) (1.62) (-0.55)
10Y 0.44 4.10 -3.10
(0.27) (1.90) (-1.04)
Cred Spr 5.92 6.70 4.69
(1.86) (1.28) (0.81)
Bd Opt -0.01 -0.01 0.02
(-0.37) (-0.38) (0.46)
FX Opt 0.00 0.01 -0.01
(-0.05) (0.75) (-0.15)
Com Opt 0.04 0.00 0.09
(1.27) (0.08) (1.48)
R2 0.03 0.06 0.03 235 Concluding Remarks
In this article, we formally establish that the pension related mispricing identi¯ed in
Franzoni and Marin (2005) can be magni¯ed by at least 50% to achieve an annual alpha
of about -15.4%. Moreover, we construct a hedged trading strategy that can be used in
combination with a wide range of benchmarks to create portable alphas. In particular,
our results can be employed to enhance indexing in equity and bond portfolios.
The combination of the actual institutional settings of De¯ned Bene¯t pension
plans and corporate management short-termism drive the outstanding performance of
the strategy. Because we do not expect major changes in these two elements during the
next few years, we believe that the strategy, or some re¯ned version of it, will continue
performing well in the near future.
24References
Bergstresser, D., Desai, M., and Rauh, J. (2005). Earnings manipulation, pension
assumptions and managerial investment decisions. The Journal of Finance, forth-
coming.
Brown, S. J. and Goetzmann, W. N. (1997). Mutual fund styles. Journal of Financial
Economics, 43:373{399.
Fama, E. F. and French, K. R. (1993). Common risk factors in the returns on stocks
and bonds. Journal of Financial Economics, 33:3{56.
Franzoni, F. and Marin, J. (2005). Pension plan funding and stock market e±ciency.
The Journal of Finance, forthcoming.
Fung, W. and Hsieh, D. A. (1997). Empirical characteristics of dynamic trading strate-
gies: The case of hedge funds. Review of Financial Studies, 10:275{302.
Fung, W. and Hsieh, D. A. (2004). Hedge fund benchmarks: A risk based approach.
Financial Analyst Journal, 60:65{80.
Fung, W. and Hsieh, D. A. (2005). Extracting portable alphas from equity long-short
hedge funds. Journal of Investment Management, forthcoming.
Goetzman, W., Ingersoll, J., Spiegel, M., and Welch, I. (2003). Sharpening sharpe
ratios. Working Paper 02-08, Yale ICF.
Sharpe, W. (1992). Asset allocation: Management style and perfromance measurement.
Journal of Portfolio Management, 18:7{19.
Stein, J. (1989). E±cient capital markets, ine±cient ¯rms: A model of myopic corporate
behaviour. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104:773{787.
Zion, D. and Carcache, B. (2002). The magic of pension accounting. Research report,
Credit Suisse First Boston.
25